Abstract: This study examines the impact of geographical diversification on financial performance of Chinese banks. The results show that, while geographical expansion improves the banks' market share, net interest margin and non-interest income, it also increases operating costs.
INTRODUCTION
The banking industry has experienced a tremendously geographic expansion in recent decades. Despite some studies linking geographical diversification with financial performance of banks, no consensus has been reached so far. Some argue that diversified banks can benefit from the economies of scope (e.g., Deng and Elyasiani, 2008) and the coinsurance effect (e.g., Akhigbe and Whyte, 2003) . On the other hand, some suggest that diversified banks suffer from value decrease due to the lack of managerial skills (e.g., Klein and Saidenberg, 1998), more complex organizational structure (e.g., Berger and De Young, 2006) , and more intensive competition (e.g., Demsetz and Strahan, 1997) . 1 China offers an ideal setting to study the relation between geographical diversification and bank performance for the following reasons: First, in the presence of underdeveloped capital markets, Chinese banks have been playing a crucial role in channeling financial resources towards firms with financing needs (Allen et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2010) . According to
The Banker, an influential financial publication, China has the largest bank market since 2013, contributing to more than 30% of the profit of the global banking industry. Second, Chinese banking industry is highly regulated. Most commercial banks, except for the Big-Five, 2 faced strict restrictions on geographical expansion. However, in 2009, China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the leading regulatory body of Chinese banking industry, announced a policy that aimed at relaxing the geographical branching restrictions 1 Our paper also adds to the existing literature on bank branching, e.g., Cohen and Mazzeo (2010) and Deller and Sundaram-Stukel (2012 (Circular No. 143 of CBRC). Specifically, the joint-stock and city commercial banks are allowed to operate in other cities, particularly for those with prior experiences in cross-region operation. In addition, the requirements on working capital are also abolished, lowering the entry threshold of small and medium-sized banks. Consequently, the level of geographical expansion of Chinese banks has been considerably influenced by the deregulation policy.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To begin with, we perform an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Nevertheless, identifying the causal effect of geographical diversification on bank performance poses challenges because banks may select the level of diversification based on unobserved characteristics, which could bias the OLS estimates in a way that is hard to predict. To mitigate the concern, we also employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, using the bank deregulation policy to instrument for the level of diversification. In the first stage, we examine the following equation:
where Branchi,t is the number of cities in which bank i operates in year t (excluding the city where it is headquartered). Policy is a dummy variable that equals 1 ratio as a requirement for expansion. We also control for other factors that may affect geographical diversification: Loanratio (total loan/total asset), Size (the natural logarithm of total assets), ROA (net income/total assets), and Age (the number of year since the bank's inception).
In the second stage, we test the following equation:
where Performancei,t is measured as follows: the market share (MS, bank i's share in total deposits in year t), the net interest margin (NIM, net interest income scaled by total deposits), the cost-to-income ratio (COST, operating costs scaled by total assets), the net income to total assets ratio (ROA), and the non-interest income share (NII, non-interest income scaled by total income). In addition to the control variables used in Eq.
(1), we also control for Growth (the growth rate of asset) and DEPO (the deposit-to-asset ratio), which may also affect bank performance.
Our main data source is BankScope database, supplemented by geographical diversification data that is manually collected from the websites and annual reports of the banks. Our sample covers the period 2006-2012. We exclude Big-Five banks because they had branches in every city even before the deregulation. Finally, we obtain 568 bank-year observations. Table 2 presents the results of Tobit regression examining the determinants of geographical expansion. As reported in column (1), the coefficient on Policy is significantly positive, suggesting that banks' geographical diversification increased significantly following the deregulation policy. Column (2) shows that the coefficient on J&C*Policy is significantly positive, indicating that joint-stock or city commercial banks experienced more geographical expansions after deregulation. Column (3) shows that Experience*Policy also has a significantly positive coefficient, suggesting that banks with prior experiences in geographical expansion tend to open more branches following deregulation. Column (4) shows that the coefficient on CAR * Policy is significantly negative, implying that the importance of capital adequacy ratio in geographical expansion is weakened after deregulation. Table 3 presents the regression results regarding the impact of geographical diversification on bank performance. As aforementioned, we use five measures to proxy for bank performance. Columns (1) and (2) present the results using market share as the performance measure. The OLS results show that the coefficient on Branch is positive and significant at the 1% level, consistent with geographical expansion increasing market share. The economic significance is also sizable: if the bank establishes 10 more branches, its market share will increase by 0.28%. The results remain unaffected using 2SLS estimation. Similarly, the results reported in columns (3) and (4) suggest that banks gain higher net interest margins after expansion. Overall, our results are consistent with branch banking stabilizing banking systems by increasing diversification opportunities.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
However, the results reported in columns (5) and (6) show a negative side of geographical expansion: banks bear higher operating costs as the level of diversification increases. These results suggest a potential tradeoff between economic gains (market shares or interest margins) and operating costs due to banks' expansion. Moreover, geographical diversification has a positive but insignificant impact on ROA as shown in columns (7) and (8), whereas it increases non-interest income as seen in columns (9) and (10). The
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics suggest that our study is relatively free of the weak instruments problem.
One potential drawback of the independent variable, Branch, is that it does not well capture the geographical footprint of banks' expansion. Thus, we use an alternative proxy for diversification that is measured based on the surface areas spanned by branches: the average distance between the city where the bank is headquartered and each prefecture in which the bank sets up at least one branch. Our results remain robust to this alternative measure. 
